Zero-Sum Victory: What We're Getting Wrong About War by Christopher D. Kolenda

Author:Christopher D. Kolenda
Language: eng
Format: mobi, epub
Tags: History & Theory, Military Policy, United States, Political Science, Military, Public Policy, History
ISBN: 9780813152899
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
Published: 2021-10-26T04:00:00+00:00

22

From Decisive Victory to Transition

With decisive victory clearly out of reach, the United States’ approach by 2004 drifted toward transition-and-withdraw. It was not a change of strategy; the Bush administration was lowering the bar of success as they sought a way out.1 Bremer passed control to the IIG’s Prime Minister Ayad Allawi on June 28; the CPA disbanded, and so did Combined Joint Task Force-7.

A new civil-military country team provided an opportunity to look at the situation with a fresh set of eyes. John Negroponte became the chief of mission at the new American embassy, and General George Casey took command of Multi-National Force—Iraq. They signed a Joint Mission Statement to reduce the civil-military rift between Bremer and Sánchez. They also established a team to assess the conflict and suggest a way forward.2

The preeminent threat, the new plan stated, was Sunni insurgents and members of the former regime—“Sunni Arab Rejectionists” and “Former Regime Elements.” The goal for the coalition was not to defeat the insurgents, but to “reduce the insurgency to levels that can be contained by ISF [Iraqi security forces], and that progressively allow Iraqis to take charge of their own security.”3 President Bush described it succinctly in a June 28 speech at Fort Bragg, “As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.”4 The essence of the plan was to build and train Iraqi security forces, hand over control to them, and draw down the US presence.5

The rules for the January 30 election, however, entrenched Sunni resistance. In the run-up, Iraqi and American officials considered whether to divide Iraq into multiple voting districts or to treat it as a single national district. Sunni Arab candidates would win seats in predominantly Sunni Arab areas such as Anbar province.6 In the single-district alternative, the Shi’a and Kurdish parties would have a significant advantage due to their sheer numbers and the probability that insecurity and insurgency would suppress the Sunni vote.

The decision to treat Iraq as a single national district was part of a UN-brokered compromise to appease Sistani’s demands for elections in 2004. This poll was to elect the Iraqi National Assembly, which would form the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG). Former CPA official Meghan O’Sullivan argues that treating Iraq as a single voting district was the only realistic way to pull off elections within this timeline.7 The decision reinforced Sunni Arab marginalization and undermined the election’s legitimacy.

Many Sunni Arab leaders called for a boycott of the election; others were probably too scared to vote due to threats made by Zarqawi and other insurgents.8 In Anbar, the turnout was only 2 percent.9 Violence on polling day was high, but 58 percent of eligible voters reportedly participated.10 Allegations of rigging included ballot stuffing, voter intimidation, fraudulent voter registration, vote buying, and importation of non-Iraqi Kurds to cast votes for Kurdish parties.11 The United Iraqi Alliance, a coalition of non-Sadrist Shi’a religious parties, came in first. The Kurdish parties were second; Allawi’s Shi’a-Sunni coalition secured only 25 seats. For the 275-member parliament, Sunnis tallied only 8 percent of the representation—less than half their proportion of the population.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.